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The challenge of managing the fuzzy front end of the innovation process is particularly
acute for large, multi-brand, research and development (R&D)-intensive firms. Poor per-
formance at generating radical innovations has resulted in many large organisations seeking
to innovate how they organise for innovation. This paper presents an inductive, longitudinal
study of an organisational experiment that sought to get ‘game-changing, radical ideas’ into
the new product development funnel of a top three pharma. The immediate outcomes of a
team-based internal innovation tournament included 33 new product ideas, 14 of which
were radical. The medium term outcome of the experiment was a reorganisation of how the
firm now pursues radical innovation activities. We link these outcomes to team leadership,
contrasting innovation processes, including decisions about how to incorporate the ‘voice of
the consumer’. The inductive, longitudinal study suggests causal interconnections between
innovation team leadership, innovation team processes, and innovation outcomes.
1. Introduction
The challenge of managing innovation is particu-larly acute for large, multi-brand, research and
development (R&D)-intensive firms. There is a high
risk of failure, with as few as one out of every 3,000
‘raw’ ideas achieving significant commercial success
in most industries (Stevens and Burley, 1997), and
outputs are often delayed, unpredictable and not con-
sistent with customer expectations (Zheng et al.,
2010). Increased competitive intensity is forcing
many firms to push new products through the idea-
tion, design, and manufacturing pipeline at a faster
rate, encouraging greater focus on accelerated devel-
opment and compressing timelines (Kach et al.,
2012).
Radical innovation is especially perilous as high-
novelty new product development (NPD) projects are
highly uncertain, making their front-end planning
process unpredictable (Vandenbosch and Clift, 2002).
By necessity, market information is scant; uncertainty
is high, and there are few, if any, a priori strategies for
managing these projects (Brentani and Reid, 2012).
While market-oriented organisations seek to reduce
the risks associated with innovation by integrating the
voice of the intended customer into the innovation
process (Asmawi and Mohan, 2011), current custom-
ers may actually be a restraining force on radical
innovation (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Danneels
and Sethi, 2003). Staff in the R&D function can
compound this complexity, as frequently they seek
autonomy in their work; they may resist hierarchical
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control; and they tend to show more loyalty to their
profession than to their employer, and they often do
not have an architectural understanding of business
strategy and product design (Miller and Olleros,
2008). Moreover, team conflict in such projects is
common. Even fundamental decisions like whether or
not to proceed further with ideas varies greatly when
decision-making teams are confronted with real-
world cases (Cowlrick et al., 2011).
The aim of this paper is to identify how large
organisations manage the fuzzy front end of the inno-
vation process when the objective is to increase the
flow of radical new products ideas. This is done
through a longitudinal study of an organisation’s
effort to supplement existing incremental innovations
with more radical ones. The focus of the inductive
study is the design and implementation of an internal
innovation tournament that sought to get ‘game-
changing, radical ideas’ into the new product devel-
opment funnel of a top three pharma. The immediate
outcomes of the experiment included 33 new ideas,
14 of which were radical. One of the two teams
involved in the tournament accounted for nearly all
of the radical innovations. As a direct consequence of
this organisational experiment, the firm have subse-
quently adopted separate structures for incremental
and radical innovation with marketing now directing
the former and R&D leading the latter.
Despite the clear need for in-depth longitudinal
studies of the innovation process, such studies are
rare (Govindarajan and Trimble, 2010). The advan-
tage of longitudinal studies is that causal intercon-
nections between innovation leadership, innovation
processes, and innovation outcomes may emerge.
This inductive study involved a level of access that is
very uncommon given the commercial sensitivity
that generally surrounds radical innovation efforts.
The study is based on data collected from 32 inter-
views over a six-year period. Interviews included
those responsible for designing the organisational
experiment, the leaders and members of the two
teams that competed in the innovation tournament,
those that judged the tournament, and follow-up
interviews with those responsible for designing how
the firm has been subsequently organised for innova-
tion in the R&D function.
Studying this corporate experiment is important
for a number of reasons. First, there is increas-
ing evidence that large firms increasingly search
for radical innovation (McLaughlin et al., 2008)
given that radical innovation drives firm growth
(Leifer et al., 2000), particularly in the R&D sector
(Eisenbeiss et al., 2008). Proficiency at innovating
via new products remains not merely a key prio-
rity for many managers but arguably the ultimate
dynamic capability within a firm (von Hippel, 2005).
Unfortunately, large firms with a dominant position
in their industry have a poor record being first to
market with game-changing innovation (Christensen
et al., 2004).
Second, our comparison of team initiatives is
important because using teams is probably the most
widely cited approach to managing the innovation
process (Boyle et al., 2005). Management needs to
maintain a balance between reducing the uncertainty
attached to innovation activities through the imple-
mentation of rules and processes, while also encour-
aging creativity and innovativeness through fluid
organisational structures (Asmawi and Mohan,
2011). A further challenge in the R&D setting is how
to facilitate a team environment conducive to market-
oriented innovation (Thamhain, 2003).
Third, while team leadership is repeatedly cited as
a critical component in successful firm-level innova-
tion, the literature to date argues that this facet of the
innovation process has not been adequately investi-
gated and is ‘conspicuously absent’ (Mumford et al.,
2002, p. 706) or unclear (Keller, 2006; Nippa, 2006).
More specifically, organisations struggle to manage
teams successfully (Barczak and Wilemon, 2003),
and ‘the issues of staffing the innovation team and
selecting the people who are going to lead the inno-
vation process have hardly been discussed in the
innovation literature’ (Buijs, 2007, p. 203).
Fourth, there is relatively little research that
explores the management of the fuzzy front end of
the innovation process. The fuzzy front end of the
innovation process is where new ideas are developed
to a stage where nascent ideas are sifted and ranked
(Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007). Recent research
suggests that the fuzzy front end of innovation is a
distinct and different stage in the innovation process,
and therefore organisations may need to manage this
stage of the process differently (Roper et al., 2008;
Brentani and Reid, 2012).
Our inductive, revelatory study focuses on innova-
tion process and team leadership during the fuzzy
front end of an innovation process. The study sug-
gests causal interconnections between innovation
leadership, innovation processes, and innovation out-
comes. The data suggest that the initial sense making
of a team leader shapes how a team manages the
innovation process, which in turn, influences the
nature of the innovation outcome. In our comparative
study, the team leader who presided over the team
that ultimately generated more radical innovations
espoused the supremacy of science, individual
freedom, and passion as the springboard for radical
new ideas. This team engaged in more external net-
working, spent more time on idea generation, and
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delayed integrating the voice of the customer into the
process of evaluating and prioritising radical new
product ideas. In contrast, the leader of the second
team, which was praised in the initial evaluation for
delivering ‘consumer tested’ new product ideas,
albeit ideas that were less original and more incre-
mental, project managed his team. This team were
more inward looking and relied to a much larger
extent on the ‘voice of the consumer’ in forming,
assessing and prioritising ideas.
Follow-up interviews with the organisation three
years after the initial tournament suggest that the
organisation has internalised the lessons of the
experiment and innovated its approach to developing
radical innovation as a consequence. The firm
adopted a structural separation of the management
of radical and incremental innovation. A new White
Space innovation team now focuses exclusively on
radical innovation. The composition of this team, and
the choice of its leader, reflect the characteristics of
the ‘radical innovation’ team from the innovation
tournament.
The following account of corporate innovation
begins by broadly reviewing the literature to identify
the key issues involved in the management of the
ideation phase of radical innovation. This is followed
by a description of our longitudinal inductive study
and the data collection process. Over the period 2007
to 2013, data were collected from 32 interviews with
senior executives, team leaders, and team members.
These detailed interviews provide insight into the
design of the innovation tournament, the approach of
the two team leaders, the experience of the team
members, the organisation’s assessment of the teams,
in terms of which team ‘won’, and the changes to
how the organisation pursues radical innovation. The
innovation tournament and the approaches of the two
teams are described and their processes analysed in
detail. The paper concludes with implications for
researchers and managers, setting out how organisa-
tions might manage for radical innovation during the
fuzzy front end of the innovation process.
2. Literature review
To answer the question of how organisations can
increase their output of radical new product ideas,
this section defines radical innovation and what it
means in the context of the organisation that is the
focus of this study. It also identifies how the organi-
sational and managerial challenges of the fuzzy front
end of the innovation process might differ where the
outcome sought is radical innovation.
2.1. Defining radical innovation
Innovations are often analysed in terms of extremes:
incremental and radical (e.g., McDermott and
O’Connor, 2002); continuous and discontinuous
(Veryzer, 1998); and sustainable innovation and dis-
ruptive innovation (Christensen et al., 2004). There
are many diverse descriptions of radical innovation:
‘discontinuous innovation’ (Anderson and Tushman,
1990); ‘emerging technology’ (Day and Schoemaker,
2000); ‘architectural innovation’ (Tushman et al.,
2010); and ‘disruptive’ technology (Christensen
et al., 2004). More specifically, in terms of ideas,
radical innovation ideas have been defined as inno-
vations that embody a new technology that results
in a new market infrastructure (Song and Montoya-
Weiss, 2001); and as innovations that create a de-
mand previously unrecognised by the consumer
(Garcia and Calantone, 2002).
Regardless of the variation in words used to
describe radical innovations, some common elements
are present in most definitions. Definitions of radical
innovation generally allude to aspects related to high
market and technological uncertainty, new market
creation, new capabilities in the innovating firm, and
the possibility that such innovations might cannibal-
ise a firm’s prior business model. Leifer et al. (2001)
define radical innovation thus:
A radical innovation is a product, process, or
service with either unprecedented performance
features or familiar features that offer signifi-
cant improvements in performance or cost that
transform existing markets or create new ones.
(p. 103)
Notwithstanding the precise nature of this defini-
tion, the degree of radicalness of an innovation is
conceptually challenging to define or measure. This
is particularly the case during the early stage of emer-
gence of an innovative product idea. Categorising an
innovation as either radical or incremental therefore
remains somewhat subjective. There may be a con-
tinuum of innovations that range from radical to
incremental with a new product or service’s position
on this continuum depending upon perceptions of
those familiar with the degree of departure of the
innovation from the state of knowledge prior to its
introduction.
In the context of the experiment examined in
this study, radical innovation describes new commer-
cial ideas that have two characteristics. First, they
demand new technology or new scientific know-how,
new molecules for new therapy area expertise;
perhaps not necessarily new to the world but new to
the firm at least. Second, they should appeal to new
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consumer groups, new segments, new therapy areas,
or new patient groups. To qualify for the description
of ‘radical’, in this study, ideas needed to qualify
under both headings: new science for a new market.
2.2. Managing for radical innovation at
the fuzzy front end
Research that studies innovation in terms of process
is underdeveloped in the literature (Crossan and
Apaydin, 2010). Approaches to understanding the
temporal sequencing of innovation typically assume
that innovation projects are characterised by ideas
that emerge as relatively raw, fragmentary, embry-
onic thoughts and connections, and that these raw
ideas require some level of incubation in order to
develop selected nascent ideas into testable concepts.
Recent research on the innovation process suggests
that the innovation journey is described as a three-
phase process (Hansen and Birkinshaw, 2007; Roper
et al., 2008). The first phase, the fuzzy front end,
describes the process of developing new ideas, vari-
ously referred to as discovery, idea generation, or
knowledge sourcing. The second phase describes
how teams sift, prioritise, and rank nascent ideas; it
deals with how raw, often technical ideas are con-
verted into tangible innovation propositions. This
phase is variously referred to as the incubation,
opportunity, idea conversion, and transformation
phase. The third phase refers to the launch, introduc-
tion, or implementation of the new ideas within the
organisation. This third phase is variously referred
to as acceleration, realisation, idea diffusion, and
exploitation as it deals largely with implementation;
often with a focus on project management.
Extant studies of radical innovation typically focus
on the latter stages of the innovation process, that is,
the stages that follow ideation (Kach et al., 2012)
with very few focusing on the idea generation phase
despite the challenges of managing for radical inno-
vation being particularly pronounced during the
fuzzy front end of the innovation process (Buijs,
2007; Sarin and O’Connor, 2009). These challenges
arise because radical R&D innovation projects differ
from incremental innovation projects in a number of
ways. Radical innovation is inherently complex
because typically they involve the following: high
levels of technical expertise; high levels of creativity;
extensive search; engagement with new, external
partners; and an understanding of current and likely
future market demand. These projects are risky
and frequently involve unforeseen processes, and
as a result, setbacks and disruptions are frequent
(Leenders et al., 2007). These issues are com-
pounded by the evidence that there is no correlation
between R&D expenditure and overall financial per-
formance from innovation, hence simply investing
more in R&D does not guarantee success (Holman
et al., 2012).
In managing for radical innovation, the standard
processes that work for incremental innovation may
not be useful (McDermott and O’Connor, 2002;
Pawar et al., 2009). There is evidence that some
approaches to managing innovation may not be
suited to radical innovation. For example, stage-
gating processes may be better suited to producing
small, incremental innovations (Cooper et al., 2002).
Less formal management processes, including in par-
ticular, less formal assessment and evaluation cri-
teria, may be suited to the ideation phase of radical
innovations (Martinsuo and Poskela, 2011).
In designing innovations systems that are focused
on radical innovation, there are a number of elements
that organisations need to consider. First, while a
closed innovation system might deliver incremen-
tal innovation, existing literature suggests that
collaborating with organisational and individual net-
works are more likely to yield radical innovation
(Kärkkäinen and Ojanperä, 2006; Bahemia and
Squire, 2010). More specifically, at the idea genera-
tion stage, Steiner (2009) suggests that collaborative
creativity, which is, tapping into external sources of
ideas, is a prerequisite for the generation of radical
innovation ideas. Steiner (2009), in his call for ‘open
creativity’, notes the particular contribution a net-
worked, collaborative approach can make in the crea-
tive, idea-generation phase of innovation. Managing
radical innovation projects, at the front end, is likely
to demand greater levels of flexibility, responsive-
ness, and the incorporation of new information
(Vandenbosch and Clift, 2002).
Second, a further difference in the management
of radical innovation relates to the ‘voice of the con-
sumer’. While organisations are increasingly involv-
ing customers in their innovation process so that
new market introductions are aligned with customer
wants and needs (Leifer et al., 2000), extant research
on innovation suggests that the voice of the customer
is generally unhelpful in the search for radical new
ideas (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Danneels and
Sethi, 2003); with only limited instances in which
close customer ties have led to the commercialisation
of successful, radical ideas (Fredberg and Piller,
2011). In instances where consumers have been
found to be helpful in generating high-potential,
novel ideas, it has been a specialist group of lead
users and not mainstream consumers (Von Hippel,
2005); such users have been found to have high moti-
vation to seek new solutions, possess a diverse set of
competencies, and be embedded in a supportive
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environment (Lettl et al., 2006). Furthermore, in
managing an innovation project, predicting likely
market demand for radical innovation poses a
dilemma as if the idea is genuinely highly novel,
there will be no suitable benchmarks against which to
compare it.
Despite the obvious leadership challenges in man-
aging radical innovation, extant research typically
understates the leadership role in the R&D process
(Edmondson and Nembhard, 2009). For example,
Nippa argues that ‘comprehensive reviews of the
broad research on critical success factors of manag-
ing product innovation in most cases do not empha-
sise leadership or leadership styles explicitly’ (2006,
p. 2). While this may be true for the innovation lit-
erature, there has been considerable research con-
ducted to examine the characteristics of the ideal
R&D team leader (Edmondson and Nembhard, 2009;
Sarin and O’Connor, 2009). While not synonymous
with an innovation leader, the R&D team leader rep-
resents a close proxy. This research on R&D team
leaders generally propose that the team leader must
have both the ‘soft’ people skills and the ‘hard’
project management skills to manage complex, often
lengthy and frequently technical projects; and it
increasingly identifies networking skills as a feature
of the R&D process.
Research has highlighted the management chal-
lenges involved in managing for radical innovation.
These include the formality or rigidity of the pro-
cesses used within teams to manage the processes of
idea generation and idea prioritisation; the challenge
of if, when, and with what emphasis, to integrate the
voice of the consumer into the innovation process; and
how ‘open’ teams should be in the idea generation
phase. These ideas about the management of radical
innovation informed the inductive study of an organi-
sation experiment to generate radical innovation. The
research was guided by the following questions:
• How does a large organisation manage innovation
activities at the fuzzy front end of the innovation
process where the objective is to increase the flow
of radical new products ideas?
• Should approaches to managing the fuzzy front
end of the innovation process be contingent on the
nature of the innovation (radical or incremental)
desired?
3. Research design
3.1. Research method and context
The paper summarises a revelatory, inductive study
of an organisation experiment, what we refer to as the
Radical Innovation Tournament (RIT), based in the
R&D division of one of the world’s top three pharma
firms (referred to as Pharmaco). Yin (2003) contends
that the case study approach is essential when elabo-
rate social situations are under scrutiny, because one
of its strengths as a research methodology is that it
affords a strategy for examining composite, real-life
situations. The case study approach successfully
manages the countless inter-related elements embed-
ded in real-life situations, which combine to create
the phenomenon. Idiographic is how Bryman (2004)
expressed the nature of case study research as its
aim is to expound the distinctive elements of the
event under investigation, while also attending to
contextual features. Case-study research is especially
appropriate for research into real, complex situations
(Perry, 1998), and new topic areas with a focus on
‘how’ or ‘why’ questions (O’Connor, 1998), concern-
ing a contemporary set of events including those
relating to radical innovation. Govindarajan and
Trimble favour case studies as the best way to
build knowledge about innovation, arguing that ‘the
only way to study the management of innovation
initiatives is to compile in-depth, multiyear case
studies’ (2010, p. xiii).
Design principles for inductive qualitative studies
of firms as set out by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007)
and Yin (2003) were followed in designing this study.
RIT was a purpose-designed innovation tournament
intended to encourage a higher level of radical inno-
vation in new product development. Specifically, the
project sought to get more ‘game-changing, radical
ideas’ into Pharmaco’s new product development
pipeline. This time-bound initiative involved two
teams based in separate sites, one in the United
Kingdom and one in the United States, competing for
nine months to produce innovative ideas. The comp-
any’s Global President of R&D describes the genesis
of the project:
It was the first time we had a talent review
process within the R&D community and we
created a category of people that we felt were
‘innovative’. . . The question that we discussed
at the talent review, well, if you’ve got a group
of people identified as innovators, why don’t
we ask them to work on identifying new ideas
for the company through whatever creative
processes they want to? . . . to work with a
completely open brief, unconstrained by inter-
ference by senior management, for a period of
time to generate radical ideas.
This discussion evolved into a commitment to an
organisational experiment, referred to as the RIT,
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which was designed to get more, novel, game-
changing ideas into the R&D pipeline. Specifically,
the teams were resourced as follows: 10–12
members in each of two teams – one in United
Kingdom and one in the United States, with the two
teams to be created equal in terms of the quality,
technical expertise (almost all PhD’s in science dis-
ciplines), and experience [including senior manage-
ment up to Vice President (VP) level] of personnel.
The team members were required to commit to
devoting at least 20% of their time to RIT. Each
team received a budget of $250 000, to be allocated
however the team leaders decided. The teams could
access more funds if required for specific purposes.
The teams were not required to provide any report
on their progress during the nine months of the
project.
This experiment represents an interesting context
for the study of radical innovation for several
reasons. The RIT project provided access to the con-
structs of particular interest: radical innovation in an
R&D context; the fuzzy front end of the innovation
process; and a team-based approach to innovation. A
priori, it appeared that the RIT initiative was a good
context for studying the development of what the
teams and the organisation considered to be ‘radical’
innovations. The project specifically encouraged the
two teams to explore opportunities outside the organ-
isation’s existing operations. The brief to the teams
required them to deliver nine discrete innovation
opportunities for new products and/or services, six
of which were to be rooted in current brands and
therapy areas, and three were to come from new
areas, new markets, possibly using technologies that
were unfamiliar to the firm. Getting insights into the
development of radical innovations is particularly
difficult because, by its nature, radical innovation
within large organisations is rare, can be difficult to
identify a priori, and often takes long periods of time
before it is apparent if the innovation is in fact
radical.
The nature of the RIT initiative was a good context
for gaining insights into how teams manage for inno-
vation. The design of the RIT initiative was a result of
deliberate senior management choices. It is was an
organisational experiment in that the two teams were
provided with the same brief; were ‘created equal’
insofar as was possible with experience, expertise,
and seniority balanced across the two teams; were
based in different geographic contexts (the United
Kingdom and the United States); where given an
equal and fixed amount of time (nine months) and
budgetary resources; and the outcomes were ‘judged’
by senior management, with one team adjudicated to
have ‘won’ the contest.
Another feature of the study is the access
Pharmaco provided explicitly for the purposes of
doing research. The motivation of senior manage-
ment was that if the RIT initiative successfully pro-
duced radical innovations they wanted to understand
how best they could exploit the initiative and if they
could apply lessons from the initiative to other
aspects of the firm’s innovation process. Such access
is highly unusual given both the commercial and
organisational sensitivities attached to such projects.
A further feature of the study is that the industry
and firm context is in and of itself of importance. This
context has been the attention of focus with the lit-
erature on innovation because the pharmaceutical
industry, possibly more than any other, depends on
innovation for success: ‘The key to long-term growth
has to be R&D pipeline success’ (McNamara, 2004,
p. 25). Within extant literature researchers have used
case studies of firms from the pharmaceutical indus-
try to gauge cultural enablers supporting innovation
(Balsano et al., 2008), and to divide the new product
innovation process into two distinct phases of early
and late-stage development (Bonabeau et al., 2008).
Within the pharma industry, decisions often need to
be made based on insufficient data and with a high
degree of uncertainty, acute time pressure, in an envi-
ronment where decisions are costly (clinical trials,
etc.) and, often against a competitive backdrop where
several firms are vying to be first to market for a
similar product or treatment (Cowlrick et al., 2011).
The focus firm for this study is of particular impor-
tance because it is one of the world’s top three
pharma firms, with revenues of over £30bn, and it is
one of the world’s top 10 R&D spenders. The RIT
initiative therefore provided a unique opportunity to
gain rich insights into the development of radical
innovations in a large R&D intensive organisation.
Finally, the innovation tournament was a success
in two respects. First, it resulted in 33 new product
ideas, 14 of which were radical. Some of these ideas
remain in development within the company’s pipe-
line but none have, so far, been commercialised. The
majority of the ideas that were accepted into the
R&D stage-gate process came from the UK team.
Second and equally important, the organisation inter-
nalised the lessons of the experiment and has since
innovated its approach to innovation accordingly.
3.2. Data collection and analysis
The study is based on extensive field observation, and
32 in-depth interviews conducted over a six-year
period. During the first phase of the study in 2007,
seven members of the senior management team in the
R&D division were interviewed. These corporate
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level executives were responsible for designing the
RIT initiative. The interviews provided insight into
the organisational context that surrounded the deci-
sion to initiate RIT. During the second phase, the two
RIT team leaders and all available team members
were interviewed. The interviews were framed and
guided by the overall question: ‘tell me about your
experience with the RIT team and project’. Seven-
teen interviews were conducted between February
2008 and June 2009. While there had been 25
members over the entire project, some had left
Pharmaco either during the project itself or very
shortly afterwards.
During the third phase of the research, six mem-
bers of the senior leadership team (SLT) in the R&D
division were interviewed. These six individuals had
reviewed the work of the two teams involved in the
RIT initiative and had evaluated the project ideas, to
assess the potential of the ideas for Pharmaco, and to
decide which ideas would be progressed after the
RIT initiative concluded. They were the ‘judges’ of
the RIT initiative. In the fourth phase of the field
work, the divisional head of R&D (who had been one
of the judges of the RIT contest in 2009) and the head
of a new unit in the innovation management group,
the White Space team, were interviewed in 2013,
three years after the conclusion of the project, to
determine how the RIT had shaped the organisation’s
current approach to innovation.
In collecting data on the RIT initiative, the poten-
tial bias of the interview data was reduced by
interviewing over an extended period and by sup-
plementing the interviews with extensive secondary
data on the project. This included documents such as
the briefing documents for the RIT initiative prepared
by the SLT the briefing presentation for the two
RIT teams; team data such as final presentations,
Microsoft Project Plan (US team), consumer
research data such as ‘BuzzBack’ volumetric data on
the ideas, and video footage of a number of focus
groups (US team); a ‘close-out’ report prepared by
the US team; and a ‘close-out’ report on the project
prepared by Pharmaco’s Human Resources Depart-
ment. In analysing the data, each transcript was
coded following a three-step process, allowing for
multiple levels of insight into the context of each
individual interview.
Analysis of the data followed processes used in
analysing qualitative data (Miles and Huberman,
1994; Yin, 2003). Analysis began with the transcrib-
ing of all interview data. This was followed by
writing detailed histories or narratives of the two
teams, using both the interview data and the second-
ary data. Using tables to organise the case data and a
within case comparison, the data were coded in an
‘open coding’ process (Ezzy, 2002, p. 87) to identify
themes that were central to the teams’ experiences of
‘doing’ innovation.
4. The innovation experiment
RIT was a time-bound initiative involving two teams,
one in the United Kingdom and one in the United
States, competing for nine months to produce radical
new product ideas. In following the two teams, track-
ing their activities and their experiences over a period
of years, the study became ‘A Tale of Two Cities’ as
the two teams and team leaders manifested different
approaches to the task, and, from the perspective of
Pharmaco, produced quite different outcomes.
In terms of outcomes, the two teams presented a
different number and range of ideas at the final pres-
entation event (Figure 1). The UK team presented not
just more ideas overall but more ideas that could be
categorised as radical.
Each idea was classified during the analysis as
either radical or incremental. Radical ideas had to be
new in terms of two criteria: new technology or new
scientific know-how, new molecules for new therapy
areas; and new consumer groups, new segments,
new patient or therapy areas (Figure 1). By way of
example, we describe ideas from two of the four
categories in Figure 1. Ideas were classified as incre-
mental if they (1) used an existing technology, mode
of action, science, or active ingredient within an
existing brand or (2) if they extended into either a
ISF Ideation Outputs: Radical V͝s Incremental
Existing
Ex
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US − 3 US − 1
US − 1 US − 2
UK - 12
UK - 0 UK - 1
UK - 13
Figure 1. Innovation tournament outputs.
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new technology or new market area, but not both. As
an example, if Pharmaco looked at a market within
which they already had a leading brand: i.e., smoking
cessation, and they came up with an idea of a nico-
tine mist spray – this would be considered to be
incremental because the market targeted is familiar
to the organisation and the active ingredient is also
familiar: nicotine. It is merely the delivery mecha-
nism, a spray mist device, which is new.
In contrast, ideas were classified as radical if they
involved Pharmaco moving both into new markets
and into unfamiliar technology. These ideas propose
the development of new scientific areas for exploita-
tion in new markets (and therefore requiring new
marketing competence). An example of a radical idea
from the RIT project was the digital foetal monitor
for expectant mums. This is a radical idea for
Pharmaco because the firm is not yet involved in the
market for medical devices nor does it target expec-
tant mums. The implementation of this idea would
require the firm to build new technical capability (or
alliances) and to create a new brand.
The US team were declared the winners of the RIT
tournament by the judging team. In judging the
outcome, the president of R&D judged the US team
to have remained closer to brief in terms of the
number of ideas presented. Crucially, in his opinion,
they also had commissioned some early-stage market
research on their ideas. The president of R&D justi-
fied his selection as follows:
I think it is because it was structured and they
[the US team] had data and they had consumer
research, they had pretty much concrete data
from the consumer.
However, this declaration was not the unanimous
view of the R&D senior management team, most of
who felt that the UK team had delivered ideas that
were far more original; far more radical and more
promising from a strategic perspective (Table 1). The
analysis of the data and the comparisons of the two
innovation teams highlight how one team (UK) pro-
duced innovation ideas and concepts (outcomes)
which were radical, while the other team’s (US) out-
comes were described, by the judging panel, as less
original and more incremental.
What might explain the differences in the outputs
of the two teams? The analysis of the two teams
suggests that differences in the team leaders, and
their approach were important. The difference in
process between the two teams was summarised by
one member of the senior management team as
follows:
The people in the UK just tend to be a lot more
free spirited and less structured and that
unstructured approach created a lot of conflict
I think. It’s a very interesting thing in the UK
they never got face to face. Why? Because they
could not arrange their calendars to get face to
face. . . . . . . Which I think is what the US did;
I think the US forced RIT to be a priority. The
end of the day they both did really great. It’s
just when you play it back the US was more
structured and it just tended to come over a bit
more credible than what the UK presented but
the UK was very high in creativity.
More specifically, the different approaches are sum-
marised in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 provides a descrip-
tive summary of the approach of the two teams. In
Table 3, the activities of the UK and US teams are
presented in terms of the key activities of the fuzzy
front end of the innovation process.
While the RIT initiative has not been exactly rep-
licated, the initiative had a significant impact on how
innovation is managed within the organisation. The
very clear delineation of how one team managed to
produce radical ideas, while the other delivered more
‘sustaining momentum’ incremental ideas led to an
organisational rethink of how to manage a portfolio
of innovation where there is a demand for both
radical and incremental innovation. For incremental
innovation, the new VP of R&D explained that the
organisation needs a consistent pipeline of near term,
close-in innovation, which he described as supplying
‘life-blood to the brands, keeping them fresh, com-
petitive and relevant to their consumers’. For this
type of innovation, the R&D teams are aligned to the
brand marketing and insight teams. These teams are
charged with producing regular upgrades to the
brands and products in a certain category. In terms of
voice of consumer, they apply a philosophy of ‘con-
sumer at the heart of everything we do’; they conduct
a lot of consumer insight work, and this drives the
type of projects they pursue. The output for these
teams is a steady stream of incremental innovation
in their core area. This represents the bulk of the
innovation programme.
However, following RIT, the organisation recog-
nised a need to purposefully seek out ideas for radical
innovation, and a new structure was inaugurated. The
new structure was termed the White Space team. The
White Space team works across all the categories in
which the organisation operates and not just a single
brand or therapy area, and they are not limited to the
types of opportunities they can pursue. The White
Space team has a technical remit and therefore do not
engage with consumer research. They identify and
Peter Robbins and Colm O’Gorman
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explore new technology and science and, where
appropriate, they shepherd this technology into the
organisation’s early-stage pipeline. The White Space
team is based in United Kingdom and is led by a
senior R&D scientist, whose profile is similar to the
RIT UK team leader, insofar as he is a distinguished
scientist in his field and not someone with much
exposure to marketing.
The White Space team has already had some
notable successes. For example, it identified a new
technology platform for one of the firm’s leading
brands and persuaded the organisation to invest over
$100 million to acquire the technology platform.
This gave the brand a new, higher level of perfor-
mance that represented a step change in the market,
making it the first $1bn brand within this division of
the organisation.
Another development in the innovation process
that owes its genesis to RIT is the new Open Inno-
vation team. This team reports into the commercial
division and uses a global team of technology scouts
to search round the world for opportunities in
research institutes, universities, small start-up tech-
nology firms, inventors, and any other potential
sources of novel, original, and possibly radical new
ideas. The Open Innovation team work closely with
the White Space team with one looking at the science
and the other looking at the commercial implications.
While RIT was designed as an organisational experi-
ment intended to solve a temporary drought in the
Table 1. The outcomes: comments from the judging panel
Comments on the UK team outputs Comments on US team outputs
President
of R&D
The UK just looked exclusively at new businesses –
the UK said, no, we’re going to go after the big
ideas, we’re not going to spend time on the
incremental ideas. And that was just the way it
unfolded.
Honestly the edge went to the US team. I think it is
because it was structured and they had consumer
research; they had pretty much concrete data
from the consumer. They ran it like you should
run a project. Their structured approach was very
much on brief. They came up with the ideas they
were tasked with.
Judge 1 To me, I was very impressed by the UK team. UK
presented more radical concepts and ideas – I
don’t think they included any consumer research
ok . . . Ok but they presented many really great
ideas actually. I was very impressed with the
concept and the ideas that they have developed.
I was expecting more and better science from
scientists. They (US) diluted the science by
engaging with consumers. We would have
preferred just to judge the science.
Judge 2 The UK team’s ideas were more creative although I
suspect we could have had a fraction more
process, but overall it didn’t matter too much. I
think it was better to have less process and keep
the ideas free flowing, the chaotic bit of it going,
than have more process and stifle the creativity.
What I saw was that a lot of effort had been
directed towards consumers – what I was looking
for was far more of the scientists and far less of
scientists trying to run focus groups. I didn’t find
this refreshing because a lot of money and a lot
of effort went into this RIT project. I didn’t think
this was appropriate because this was not a
training exercise. As scientists, they ought to have
focussed exclusively on the science and not got
bogged down in marketing.
Judge 3 The contrast in how the teams went about it was
amazing. One, the UK, was very emotional, full
of visual appeal and big ideas and the other (US)
was very logical, linear and methodical and a bit
predictable.
If we look at innovation in its truest form, some
chaos is necessary. I absolutely believe – that if
we had a commercial team – then, yes, research
was appropriate but there’s no point in making
first rate scientists become second rate market
researchers.
Judge 4 There was quite a difference between the UK and
the US teams approached the whole thing. I mean
the US had a much more structured approach,
they had dates by which they had to stop having
ideas for example, whereas UK were effectively
having ideas right up to a couple of days before –
they were wide open.
Go out there, innovate, find the scientific
opportunities – if we like them – then, fine –
we’ll go off and do the market research. But in
my view, that’s not what R&D are there for.
They’re there to develop scientific ideas.
I think there should have been far more effort on
the science and only after that has been
developed, evolved should you engage with
consumers. But they spent effort engaging with
consumers despite the fact that this could have
been done better by professionals.
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company’s innovation pipeline, it has turned out to be
the catalyst for considerable change in how this global
organisation manages its innovation programme.
5. Results
Analysis of the organisational experiment sug-
gests that the teams differed in terms of how they
approached three activities: managing the idea gen-
eration process; managing the process of idea pri-
oritisation; and managing the voice of the customer
during the fuzzy front end. These differences reflect
the initial interpretation by the team leader of innova-
tion at the fuzzy front end. The results suggest that
there may be a configuration logic to team-based idea
generation during the fuzzy front end of the innova-
tion process in an R&D environment (Figure 2).
5.1. Innovation leadership: interpreting
innovation at the fuzzy front end
It is evident from the study that the two team leaders
interpreted their role and that they approached the
RIT initiative in different ways. While this might
have been avoided by corporate level intervention, in
this contest as with many other corporate innovation
efforts, the widespread admonition to not overly
direct innovation processes was adhered to. Yet, as
already indicated, subsequent decisions were highly
dependent on the initial sense making of each leader.
The UK team leader was a scientist and
approached the brief with the intent of staying
focused on the science as a source of new ideas and
allowing technology drive the outputs. He stated:
I felt, as a bunch of scientists, that we should at
least stick with our scientific heritage, try and
look at science in a different way, come up with
novel technical solutions. The philosophy was
rather than have a process whereby you go
through different stats to try and pull ideas
together, is you create an environment where
people have the opportunity to read about new
areas, talk to experts in different areas, interact
with different people such that they can gener-
ate threads for their own development. . . . . . .
This was my way of thinking; it was shared, I
would say, by half the team and I’d say the
other half of the team really struggled with it.
Reflecting this view of the process resulted in the UK
team leader actively avoiding any formal processes;
Table 2. A ‘Tale of Two Cities’: the UK and US team experience
UK team US team
Team leader A scientist A project manager
Frequency of
meetings
Infrequent meetings; with full team never
actually meeting.
Team meets twice a week for 3 hr for duration
of project.
Process – The only process is ‘there is no process’.
– Engages with several external and internal
experts.
– Commissions external report.
– Do not do market research to test their
ideas.
– Team equipped with dictaphones to capture
ideas; given access to brainstorming
software to share ideas.
– Commissions market research and uses
BuzzBack to rank the ideas.
– Recruits copywriter and illustrator to
develop presentation of ideas.
– Uses volumetric research to estimate market
size.
Focus of team Ideation, with little effort to prioritise ideas. Ideation period lasts for first few months, and
this is followed by extensive time given to
prioritisation.
Engagement with
senior management
None. Team leader briefs senior management about
the ideas being pursued.
Team member
experiences
Varied by member. Overall:
– ‘No structure provided’.
– One or two people do all the ‘heavy lifting’.
– Some senior members back out of the team,
they sense it will end badly.
– Some members find experience quite
stressful.
– Members feel environment and meetings
may be too structured.
– Members find it ‘process-heavy’ – too many
meetings and very internally focused.
– More project management than creativity.
Outcomes: judges Loses contest; though the majority of the
senior management team consider the UK
ideas to be more radical and on brief.
Winner of Radical Innovation Tournament.
Team generates testable, research-ready
concepts.
Peter Robbins and Colm O’Gorman
10 R&D Management ••, ••, 2014 © 2014 RADMA and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
championing the excellence of science and challeng-
ing his team to engage externally with experts in
science so that they would develop new insights. The
team immersed themselves in the process of generat-
ing new radical ideas. The team leader focused pri-
marily on the process of generating ideas, with the
team not performing any structured idea evaluation,
idea ranking, or activities aimed at embedding the new
ideas into the organisation, on the assumption that
these were not within tournament boundaries.
In contrast, the US team leader was experienced
at managing projects within Pharmaco, and his
approach to the project was that the team should
deliver specifically on the project brief. He described
his approach as follows:
When I kicked off the meeting, I had a very
clear vision in my mind of what we wanted to
be in a position to present to SLT (Manage-
ment) nine months later. And, it wasn’t just
some ideas that have been bounced off a couple
of consumers perhaps, or bounced off internal
people. I wanted to be able to bring forward
quantitatively tested concepts of new product
Table 3. Managing the innovation process: UK and US teams
Innovation activities Innovation outcomes
Discovering and generating
new idea
Choosing among
competing ideas
Embedding the new
idea in the organisation
UK team – Arranged in-house
presentation to team from
specialist creativity agency to
help start the idea generation
process.
– Had meetings with in-market
commercial colleagues to get
insights about new therapy
areas such as allergy.
– Met other in-company
specialists in different
divisions to find out more
about conditions like diabetes.
– Met with many external
experts in different fields and
visited sites such as the sleep
laboratory in Middlesex
University.
– Commissioned open
innovation intermediary firm
to conduct technology search.
Supplied their brief to an
external open innovation
consultant.
– Sole criterion was that
if someone had
enthusiasm for the idea
– then it would remain
on the ‘shortlist’. Did
not screen the ideas
using any other criteria
apart from ‘passion’.
– Presented an
unprioritised selection.
No sales estimates
provided or consumer
research to support the
ideas. Did not make a
convincing commercial
case to support any
single idea.
– Preferred to keep their
ideas under wraps till
the final presentation in
order to ‘surprise’ the
judging panel. Did not
attempt to find
champions for their
ideas in advance of the
presentation but merely
presented a spectrum
of 26 unranked and
unresearched ideas.
13 radical ideas
12 ‘new science –
known market’
ideas
1 ‘new market-
known science’
idea
0 incremental ideas
US team – Provided team with
dictaphones to record ideas
while out of office; they were
shown a (future) trends
presentation from a specialist
agency, and they were given
access to innovation software
with which they could record,
cluster, and rank ideas.
– Stuck to their own group with
dedicated team room, strong
IT support, and regular
meetings. Did not consult
widely with other departments
or functions within the
business. No meetings with
external experts to review or
discuss their ideas.
– First screening filter
was a series of focus
groups.
– Concepts were
professionally written
and illustrated for
qualitative research:
then put through online
volumetric research to
establish likely sales
potential.
– Once the top ideas
were identified in
research; they were
selected and
refined/developed for
the final presentation.
– Continually canvassed
the opinions of SLT
about team’s ideas.
– Sensitised senior
management to the
nature and types of
ideas.
– Ran ‘Ideas Fare’ in HQ
to exhibit ideas his
team had been working
on.
1 radical idea
3 ‘new science-
known market’
ideas
2 ‘new market-
known science’
ideas
1 incremental idea
HQs, headquarters; SLT, senior leadership team.
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ideas that we had actually thought through on
the technical side and had clear approaches on
how we would go about the whole thing tech-
nically. But I wanted to make sure we had the
consumer heartbeat established to the point
that we had some quantitative concept con-
sumer test results on that.
The US team, which primarily produced incre-
mental ideas directed towards existing customer seg-
ments engaged in a structured approach that sought
to manage the project in terms of separate stages.
They spent about one quarter of their time at the
ideation stage, and then moved to ranking and
prioritisation. They invested significant time and
budget to the testing of their ideas with consumers
and used this information to help them prioritise
among the ideas they had identified.
The data suggest that the ‘laissez faire’ approach
adopted by the UK team leader allowed individuals
to develop more radical innovative ideas. The con-
verse also holds, with the more structured manage-
ment approach adopted by the US team leader
delivering a suite of incremental innovative ideas.
The contrast in the US and UK team experiences
suggests that the organisational challenge of simul-
taneously delivering incremental and radical new
ideas may require separate organisation structures to
allow for differences in how the innovation process
is managed.
5.2. Innovation process: generating new
radical ideas
The two teams contrast significantly in terms of the
internal and external networks they developed over
the life of the project. In developing ideas, the UK
team actively engaged in discussions with internal
experts and external collaboration partners (Table 3).
The first action undertaken by the UK team leader was
to brief the project out to an innovation intermediary.
He contacted an innovation agency, specialising in
open innovation, working in the healthcare field,
based in the UK but with links internationally, and
gave them the same brief he had been given as the RIT
project mandate. This gave the UK team access to
novel ideas and technologies. The second action of the
UK team leader was to encourage and facilitate his
team members to go out and meet with experts in the
fields in which they were interested. For example, The
Sleep Laboratory, a UK Sleep Research Centre,
became a contributor to some of the ideas proposed by
the UK team. The UK team actively sought input and
novel ideas from external experts and partners. The
UK team leader also arranged for internal organisa-
tion experts from the marketing function to present on
emerging therapy areas.
In contrast, according to the US team leader, at the
start the US team ‘just sat around the table and tossed
ideas out and, you know, kind of wild and wacky
stuff, the crazier the better’. The US team leader
Laissez-faire: 
allows individuals 
pursue own 
interests
Focus on science 
Incremental 
ideas
Radical ideas
Innovation 
outcomes
Innovation team processes
Engagement focused on existing 
stakeholders and internally orientated
Voice of the consumer integrated into idea 
generation and filtering
Ideas filtered using consumer feedback
Active engagement with external parties
Delayed use of the ‘voice of the 
consumer’: used to ‘road test’ team’s ideas
Ideas filtered by members ‘passion’.
Manages the 
initiative as a 
‘project’: focus on 
process
Team consensus
Focus on consumer 
needs
Innovation team 
leadership
Organisation of the 
innovation project
Once-off initiative
Open brief:
‘Game changing 
ideas’
No reporting 
requirements- ‘free 
agenda’
Time bound
Teams:
10-12 staff
Mixed levels of 
seniority
Scientists
Resources:
‘A-day-a-week’
Small budget
Figure 2. A configuration perspective to team-based idea generation during the fuzzy front end of the innovation process in an R&D
environment.
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favoured a high level of process and began to mecha-
nise the ideation process by adopting a software
package which facilitated online sharing of ideas and
allowed team members to add online to the ideas of
others. The US team remained largely self-sufficient,
confining their ideation activities to within the group
and not engaging with external experts except on one
occasion to help validate an idea already under team
discussion (Table 3). Their meetings were closed in
that they did not invite people in to share their ideas
nor did they engage in any purposeful outreach pro-
gramme in developing their ideas.
The UK team was able to infuse the innovation
process with external ideas in a deliberate way within
the context of this nine month tournament. Organi-
sations engaged in efforts to switch from a closed to
an open innovation model of innovation may be able
to achieve some of the benefits of open innovation
during the early phases of the innovation process by
allowing and supporting teams that pursue an open
model of innovation. That is, the data suggests that in
some regards it may be quite straightforward and
relatively swift for units or teams to switch from a
closed to an open innovation model of innovation, at
least in terms of the fuzzy front end of the innovation
process.
5.3. Innovation process: the prioritisation
of ideas
The RIT project ran for nine months. The US team
leader designated the first nine weeks for ideation,
that is, for generating, building upon and gathering
new ideas. From week 10, the US team moved into
idea prioritisation (Table 3). By contrast, the UK
team expended the full nine months on the ideation
or idea generation phase. Irrespective of the decision
regarding the time committed to idea generation, the
brief required each team to prioritise their ideas, as
only nine ideas were to be presented at the final
presentation. For both teams prioritising the ideas
was problematic. It was single activity that, accord-
ing to the interviews with team members, generated
the most disharmony and conflict within the teams.
The US team allowed feedback from consumers to
guide their decisions about which projects to pro-
gress and which to abandon. They did qualitative
focus groups and then early-stage, volumetric,
online, quantitative research. They did not exercise
any personal judgment about the quality of individual
ideas; if consumers liked an idea, it stayed in.
In contrast, the UK leader took the view that
passion would be the filter. In his words:
If somebody had genuine heart and enthusiasm
for an idea, they were allowed to run with it,
which actually I think is the right way of doing
it because, remember, we’re doing it from a
scientific perspective. So some of the areas of
science would not have been strengths of
everyone on the team . . . there had to be an
element of trust.
However, this did not work from the perspective
of some members of the UK team. The following
comments from three members of this team suggest
that they did not believe the best ideas made it to the
final presentation:
If you fire up twelve or thirteen individuals
who are supposed to be relatively creative and
tell them to all go get their own ideas, then how
do you then sit them down and argue which
ideas do you take forward and which ideas do
you leave behind? And do that in a way that
divorces personalities and egos from it, is
always quite tricky.
This is where the system failed – because we
had lots of very strong ideas. Some of them
made it through because of the power of the
personality rather than the strength of the idea
itself.
There were ideas that were very personal to
members of the group and largely went
through purely on the strength of the passion
the individual had for the idea. Personalities
came into play too much.
The study suggests that while the voice of the
consumer may help in prioritising incremental ideas,
the passion and influence of individuals’ may matter
more during the early phase of the process when
radical innovations are required. Managing the
tension between the need to select among competing
ideas and allowing the preferences and passions of
individuals to ‘push’ ideas was difficult for both
teams. Overall, the study suggests that the team
leader that allowed the passion of individual team
members to drive the innovation process and that
effectively ‘postponed’ the prioritisation stage, pro-
duced more radical ideas.
5.4. Innovation process: managing the
voice of the customer
The team leaders approached the issue of how to
integrate the voice of the consumer into the idea
generation process from very different and contrast-
ing perspectives. The UK team leader eschewed
market research altogether, while the US team leader
Radical innovation in global pharma
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spent considerable time and effort integrating the
voice of the consumer into the process, and allowing
consumer research dictate go/no-go decisions in the
project. The US team leader was most enthusiastic
about the prospect of his team interacting with poten-
tial customers for their ideas, believing that it would
be a significant learning experience for his team.
Specifically he stated:
Few on the team, if any, had ever even attended
a focus group as a viewer, not to mention actu-
ally leading one; in the front room with con-
sumers and talking with them. People found
that to be extremely valuable.
From the perspective of US team members, the
experience of integrating with consumers was gener-
ally perceived as positive. For example,
The experience of talking to consumers was
very uplifting, energising, very motivating,
very, very – there was an end goal in mind and
that was very powerful.
It (market research, focus-groups) was not
quite as foreign to me I had done lot of that, but
it was really fun to watch some of the people on
the team who had never done it. Because you
could see the light bulbs come on. It was truly
an epiphany.
In contrast, the UK team leader refused to dilute
the focus on raw science. He did not wish to com-
promise any of the potentially ground-breaking and
radical ideas they had by seeking consumer feed-
back. He believed that the strength of his team was
their scientific background, and he questioned why
one would bother to ‘make a second rate market
researcher out of a first-rate scientist?’ He stated:
The thrust of what we were trying to do was
very much get into the science, rather than
doing a balance between science and consumer
research.
This study suggests that placing consumers at the
heart of the innovation process and using them to de-
cide which ideas to progress and which ones to aban-
don is likely to lead to ideas of an incremental nature.
6. Conclusion
6.1. Contributions to research
Based on a systematic review of prior literature,
Crossan and Apaydin (2010) argue that previously
missed causal connections should emerge from
studying three sequential components of innovation:
innovation leadership, innovation as a process, and
innovation outcomes. The inductive approach of this
study allowed such causal connections to emerge.
Specifically, this study shows how a well-established
idea, that radical new product ideas (innovation out-
comes) benefit by being separated from normal cor-
porate routines (for example, skunk works: Huston
and Sakkab, 2006) can be linked to differences in
how innovation is managed (innovation processes),
which reflect differences in the sense making of the
team leader (innovation leadership).
First, in terms of innovation process, the study
confirms that when a team leader prioritises external
networking, the efforts are more likely to lead to
radical innovation ideas. This finding is in line with
prior research (Kärkkäinen and Ojanperä, 2006;
Bahemia and Squire, 2010). In particular, in terms of
idea generation, firms may need to engage in ‘open
creativity’. Steiner (2009) argues that ‘open creativ-
ity’ is for creativity, what Chesbrough’s ‘open inno-
vation’ is for innovation’ (2009, p. 5).
Second, the study suggests that integrating the
voice of the customer into the process of idea evalu-
ation and prioritisation is more suited to efforts to
generate incremental innovation outcomes. Desouza
et al. (2008) assert that organisations are increasingly
innovating in partnership with their customers
thereby subtly changing their innovation strategies
from ‘innovating for customers’ to ‘innovating with
customers’. Many firms fear that if the voice of the
customer is absent from the innovation process, there
is a high risk that the project will be so divorced from
consumer wants and needs that it will fail to be
aligned to the market (Leifer et al., 2000), and such
ideas will be difficult for an organisation to embrace.
High-customer involvement may be a constraint on
radical changes in an organisation’s market offerings
and/or business models (Christensen and Raynor,
2003; Danneels and Sethi, 2003). So while customers
can assist in the generation of new product ideas,
they are unlikely to propose breakthrough ideas
(Dell’Era et al., 2011). The inconclusiveness of this
debate about the role of the consumer in the innova-
tion process may reflect a failure to differentiate
between the nature of the innovation sought. While
the voice of the consumer may help in prioritising
ideas, the passion and influence of other actors in the
process may matter more during the early phase of
the innovation process when radical innovations are
required.
Third, this study addresses an important gap in
the literature regarding the link between leadership
and the outputs of innovation teams (Ancona and
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Caldwell, 2007; Sarin and O’Connor, 2009). While
prior literature has explored leadership in innovation,
research typically fails to identify the differential
efficacy of leadership styles at the different phases of
the innovation process or for different innovation
outcomes. The study suggests that the appropriate-
ness of leadership approach may be contingent on the
objective of the innovation process, at least during
the fuzzy front end of the process. A leader that
emphasises the role of the individual and that mini-
mises formal management processes may be appro-
priate at the early idea generation phase where the
outcome sought is radical innovation. Such an
approach may result in more experimentation and
higher tolerance of risk taking and failed ideas,
factors associated with successful innovation team
leadership (West and Anderson, 1996). In contrast, a
leader that focuses on ‘project managing’ the inno-
vation process may be most appropriate where the
objective is to generate incremental innovation ideas.
In conclusion, this inductive study suggests a ten-
tative causal connection between innovation leader-
ship, innovation processes, and innovation outcomes
in the context of radical new product ideas in an
R&D setting. More specifically, the data suggest that
in the context of a specific organisational innovation
initiative, the development of innovative ideas during
the fuzzy front end of the innovation process can be
described in terms of configurations of innovation
leadership and aspects of the innovation process –
how the teams approached the discovery and genera-
tion of new ideas, how they chose among competing
ideas, and how they embedded the ideas into the
organisation. Specifically, the case data suggest two
configurations of innovation leadership, innovation
process, and innovation outcome. A configuration of
a team leadership approach that championed the
individual and ‘science’ in generating and choosing
among ideas and that sought external new external
involvement in the process of generating ideas was
associated with more radical innovation ideas. A con-
figuration of a team leadership approach that focused
on managing the process and that sought to involve
the needs of the consumer and the voice of the con-
sumer in the process of generating and selecting
ideas was associated with more incremental ideas.
While aspects of these casual connections may
reflect the specifics of the context, in particular the
nature of the organisation (a large, global R&D inten-
sive firm, where R&D is considered to be an engine
of innovation), the location of the initiative in the
R&D function, and the time-bound nature of the
innovation tournament, we argue that the connec-
tions and configurations are consistent with existing
theories of creativity and innovation. Theoretically,
the team leaders might have influenced innovation
outcomes because of how they influenced the organi-
sational context. This suggests that organisational
context, as influenced by the team leader, created
the context that individuals could generate radical
ideas. Theories of creativity and innovation, such as
Amabile’s (1988) componential theory of creativity,
suggest that both aspects of the social context and of
the individual (domain relevant skills, creativity-
relevant processes, and intrinsic task motivation)
determine levels of creativity and innovation. While
individual level factors might have influenced the
outcome of the innovation tournament, in designing
the innovation tournament both teams were com-
prised of individuals that senior management
believed were capable of delivering radical innova-
tions, with prior performance at innovation determin-
ing why some members were invited to participate in
the tournament.
6.2. Implications for managers
How do large organisations manage innovation activ-
ities at the fuzzy front end of the innovation process
where the objective is to increase the flow of radical
new products ideas? While extant literature argues
for the importance of innovation, the literature often
neglects to address exactly how this should be done
(Katzenbach and Smith, 2005). Prior research has
identified an inventory of factors which are believed
to support radical innovation. However, an unin-
tended consequence of this is that managerial guide-
lines become fragmented (Igartua et al., 2010).
Indeed, it could be argued that the several decades of
research into how to manage the innovation process
have failed to provide clear and consistent findings
or coherent advice for managers (Tidd, 2001). This
research has specific implications for organisations
and managers, who participate in, use, commission,
or manage R&D teams to deliver on innovation
objectives.
First, in designing innovation activities, organisa-
tions should consider the nature of the innovation
outcome desired – radical or incremental. Structural
separation of the responsibility for incremental and
radical innovation may help generate more radical
innovations ideas. Specifically, separating the fuzzy
front-end phase of initiatives aimed at generating
radical innovations may allow the organisation to
adopt different, and less formal, process and may
allow senior managers responsible for staffing inno-
vation projects to vary leadership approach, or
leaders.
Second, organisations can generate radical innova-
tive ideas in a relatively short period of time through
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the use of team-based innovation initiatives. The
study highlights that ‘opening’ the innovation
process within a specific project context can occur
relatively easily and quickly. Therefore, organisa-
tions engaged in efforts to switch from a closed to an
open innovation model of innovation may be able
to achieve some of the benefits of open innovation
during the early phases of the innovation process by
allowing and supporting teams that will pursue an
open model of innovation. That is, the data suggest
that in some regards it may be relatively straight-
forward for organisations to switch from a closed to
an open innovation model of innovation, at least in
terms of developing radical ideas. Organisations may
also be able to jump start the innovation process. A
time-compressed organisational initiative such as
the tournament described in this study can channel
the expertise of R&D staff in ways that facilitate the
rapid development of new radical ideas.
Third, in terms of the management of R&D inno-
vation teams responsible for generating radical ideas,
team leaders should encourage team members to
engage in new internal and external information-
seeking activities. This should bring the benefits of
external information flow into the organisation by
harnessing the capabilities of individual R&D spe-
cialists to assimilate and apply this knowledge in
the context of the organisation’s existing knowledge
base and capabilities. Therefore, R&D team mem-
bers should purposefully supplement their existing
knowledge with new knowledge from (new) external
knowledge sources.
Finally, organisations should consider carefully
the role of customer interaction in the process. It
would appear that higher focus on customer interac-
tion is likely to guide efforts towards incremental
changes to existing offerings and conversely leaving
consumers out of the process may run the risk of
generating ideas which are not aligned with market
wants and needs. Once firms have designated their
objective for a specific innovation target, whether
radical or incremental, this should guide the level of
consumer interaction they undertake.
6.3. Limitations and future research
The findings of our inductive case study need to be
considered in the context of limitations. First, the
study revolves around a single-case design, with the
case situated within the R&D department of a major
pharma firm. Both R&D itself (Mumford et al., 2002)
and the pharmaceutical industry (McNamara, 2004)
have singular characteristics associated with them
which may make findings in this area less genera-
lisable. Second, radical innovation is difficult to study
as radical ideas may not be recognised as such during
the early stages of the innovation process. While the
follow-up interviews show that some of the radical
ideas have already influenced the firm’s product
portfolio, other ideas may take longer to develop.
Therefore, it is difficult to assess the success of the
tournament in terms of implemented new radical
ideas. Third, in respect to the innovation process we
focussed on a singular intervention in isolation. We
did not consider how the tournament impacted on
other aspects of the organisation or on the team
members. For example, we do not know if engaging
in the tournament impacted on the individual team
members job performance, whether negatively or
positively, during or after the tournament. The case
data suggest that for some members, the experience of
the tournament was not positive, with members with-
drawing from the process. Fourth, the inductive nature
of this study meant that we did not, ex ante, privilege
the role of the team leader. Results suggest that the
team leader is an important causal determinant of both
innovation process and innovation outcomes. Future
studies of innovation could include a more explicit
focus on the team leader and on team leadership,
including a focus on the cognitive and behavioural
aspects of team leadership.
Given the absence of detailed cases that explore
the causal relationships between innovation leader-
ship, innovation process, and innovation outcomes,
further research is required. Such research should be
across a broader range of organisational contexts.
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